NexTech 2009



Secure Multicast Communication

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Course overview



- Secure Multicast Communication
 - Overall motivation
- Overall Architecture
 - Motivation for using multicast
- Participant Access Control
 - Receiver Access Control, Sender Access Control
 - Policy Mechanisms
 - Mobility

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Key Management

- Proxy Encryption
- SIM-KM

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- Authentication
- Implementation
- E-commerce Interactions
 - Survey
 - Protection Profile
 - Protocols
- Control Plane Security







- Many advantages for the End Users
- Potentially very lucrative for the Content Providers
- But, a growing challenge for the Network Service Providers and Content Servers

Network Structures






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
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
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Summary




- Number & speed of Access Networks is growing
 - This puts more load on the Core Networks
- □ For "central server" applications
 - Even higher load on the Core Network
 - Very high load on the Content Server
- □ It is in these areas that a solution is needed


Today's Transaction Model



- Customer accepts offer from Content Provider
 - Encryption (defined by the Content Provider) is used to prevent theft
- Delivery is "over the network"
 - Network only "moves the bits"



Network Service Provider View




- Network Service Provider only charges for "access to the network"
- Network Service Provider can deliver all services using "unicast" (one-to-one) communication
 - Each client (End User) has his/her own path

Access Control



Two types of access control

- Access to the service (controlled by the Content Provider, once per session)
- Access to the network (controlled by the NSP, once per signon)



Tomorrow's Delivery Model



- As the Client Base increases, likelihood of simultaneous demands for identical material increases
- For "centralized" services, the network may saturate under heavy demand, and the Content Server is likely to reach an upper limit

Multicast: A Solution




- Each End User shares common parts of the distribution path
- Each packet of the session flow only needs to be sent once
 - Capacity of sender(s) does not need to grow
 - Capacity of the network can be smaller
- Core Routers must duplicate packets of a particular session


Standard Multicast



- Has been standardized for many years
- Multicast Advantages
 - Lower demands on the Content Server
 - Lower resource utilization in the network
 - \rightarrow increase in scalability (= more revenue)



Key Problem with Standard Multicast



- The Data Distribution Tree has been built by the network, without consulting the Content Provider
- The Content Provider does not know which End Users have received the session information
- Vulnerable to fraudulent access by non-authorized Senders and/or End Users

Resolving the Problem



Session

- Defines the product that you purchased
- Provides the keys for encryption
- Data Distribution Tree
 - Defines the network-level group
 - Joining will cause the End User's computer to be grafted onto the Data Distribution Tree
- Our solution is to take the existing *network access* protocol, and use it to control access to individual *sessions*

Gaining Control 1



For End Users

- Combine the Session and Data Distribution Tree Join actions
- Carry the session authorization on the DDT Join
- □ This allows the NSP to:
 - Determine who you are (authentication)
 - Determine that you are allowed to receive this session (authorization)
 - Record delivery of the product corresponding to a specific session (for accounting)

Gaining Control 2



For Senders


- We had to introduce a "Sender Join" action at the *network* level, to provide Sender Access Control for the Session
- This then allowed us to use the extended standard network access protocols to allow managing a session
- Thus, the NSP can control and account for senders

Secure Multicast



- Achieving this control allows the NSP to "build a fence"
 - Control the End User access to the session
 - Control the Sender access to the session
- The Data Encryption Keys will be distributed only to legitimate participants
- The Data will only be accepted from a legitimate Sender, and will only be delivered to legitimate End Users.

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Other Issues Resolved



- Managing the Data Encryption Keys given multiple session participants
- Protecting the Data Distribution Tree against bogus data insertions
- Extending the Work to Multiple Administrative Domains
 - Senders will not always have the same Network Service Provider as the End Users
- Extending the Work to Mobile Environments

Current Issues



- Protecting the Neighbour Relationships among the Routers
 - To prevent intruders from altering the shape of the Data Distribution Tree
- Interfacing with the E-Commerce world
 - To collect the money

Technology Transfer



Standardization to be done

- Extensions to Network Level Join, to carry session credentials
- Use of the standard (network-level) Authentication protocol to achieve session control
- Application of a newly-defined extension to the standard Authentication protocol to permit "fast" mobile handoff
- Standardization in progress
 - Management of neighbour relationships for multicast routers

Future Work



- Digital Rights Management
 - Achieving control even after the session is over
- Implementation
 - Value-added routers: the XORP project
 - Extensions to existing protocols

Thank you!



Questions?

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